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Summary: The aim of this article is to show that, in his
use of the word ‘representation’, Philip Kitcher is com-
mitted to a particular notion of representation, which is
essential to his argument for Real Realism in his paper
Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy (Real Realism heri-
nafter). After a short presentation of Kitcher’s original
argument for Real Realism, I show that Kitcher’s noti-
on of representation is not indisputable. By producing
an alternative version of Kitcher’s argument, one which
does not rely on this term ‘representation’, I show the
force and functioning of the Galilean strategy itself. A
comparison of the two formulations of the argument re-
veals what is additionally brought in by Kitcher’s notion
of representation: specifically, a particular answer to the
question of what truth consists in. This presumed cor-
respondence theory of truth is needed to achieve Real
Realism by the Galilean strategy. The positive upshot
is, however, that one can support the Galilean strategy
as such, without being a Real Realist: One can apply the
strategy to any other conception of truth.
1 Representations, the Galilean strategy and
Kitcher’s argument for Real Realism
The question driving this article is whether or not the use of
the word ‘representation’, informed as it is by a particular, asso-
ciated concept of representation, is essential to Philip Kitcher’s
argument for Real Realism in his paper Real Realism: The Ga-
lilean Strategy. The answer will be that it is, insofar as with his
concept of representation Kitcher presupposes a particular ans-
wer to the question as to what truth consists in.
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I answer this question by explaining Kitcher’s Galilean strategy,
as well as showing how his understanding of ‘representation’,
which does a lot of work for his argument, is not neutral and
thus not indisputable. The upshot is that whilst there is a Ga-
lilean strategy which I am gladly willing to support it does not,
and need not, lead to Real Realism, since it is possible to combine
it with a different and much weaker conception of truth.
The article will proceed in the following way: First I present my
understanding of Kitcher’s original argument in a concise form.
In Section 3, I produce three reasons not to use the term ‘re-
presentation’ in the way Kitcher does. This shows the extent to
which Kitcher has a concept of representation that needs to be
argued for. In Section 4, I present Kitcher’s argument in a version
that does not use his notion of representation. It will then be seen
in the following, fifth, section that the result of this new version
of the argument is not yet Real Realism. To attain Real Realism
from this new version we need to add a specific truth theory: the
truth theory to which Kitcher’s original version of the argument
is committed in virtue of his notion of representation.
2 Kitcher’s argument in Real Realism
In his text Real Realism, Kitcher gives an argument for a sort
of scientific Realism, for Real Realism. He does so by rejecting
what he thinks are the major and most serious opponents of Rea-
lism today: Empiricism and Constructivism. As I understand the
argument, the two major devices Kitcher uses are the natural
epistemological attitude (NEA) and the Galilean strategy. NEA
is the following position:
“We are animals that form representations of the things
around us; that is, the world sometimes puts human
beings into states that bear content. Those states, in turn,
guide our behaviour. In observing, or thinking about,
other people, we take it for granted that their representa-
tional states sometimes adequately and accurately repre-
Representations and the Galilean Strategy 75
sent objects, facts, and events that we can also identify.”
(Kitcher 2001: 153f.)
It is important for Kitcher that everyone accepts this position. It
is the starting point of his argumentation to which our everyday
life commits us.
The first opponent, Empiricism, is then directly rejected by the
Galilean strategy. Roughly speaking, this strategy allows particu-
lar methods of justification which are already accepted in certain
areas to be utilised in those areas of science where verifying the
results is not possible in a way that is independent of those me-
thods of justification. Scientific instruments that are accepted in
areas where we can verify the results independently of these in-
struments should also be accepted in those other areas where we
cannot do this. Kitcher argues that there is no relevant difference
between these two areas that prevents a justificatory strategy
that works in one area from working in the other area, as well.
It would be metaphysical hubris to claim that our possibility of
independent testing in one area but not in the other is a relevant
difference. In order to reject Empiricism, this Galilean strategy
extends, in particular, the scope of the inference from success to
truth. This inference is warranted in our everyday life1 and in
parts of science where independent testing of results is possible.
There is nothing which would prevent this inference from being
equally valid in other scientific areas. The success-truth link can
be used in all areas of science. The result of this argument, or
1 What matters for Kitcher’s argument is the extension of the scope
of methods that are allowed in areas of science where testing the
results of these methods independently of the methods themselves
is possible to areas where this independent testing is not possible.
This extension has a parallel in the extension of the scope of methods
accepted in everyday life to science. That these cases are parallel
is shown by the fact that Kitcher in his text uses examples from
everyday life in order to show that the transfer of methods between
two areas of science is justified. Since the difference between these
kinds of transfers does not matter for my case, I will ignore it in
what follows.
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this part of the argumentation, is that the empiricist, who ac-
cepts the success-truth inference in everyday life, should accept
this inference in the sciences, too. The separation of two realms,
the realm of observables and that of unobservables, is undermined
by this Galilean strategy: It is impossible to draw a line between
these realms in a manner that would provide a difference that
prevented those methods of justification which are applied in one
of the realms from being applicable in the other.
The line of thought against Constructivism also uses the Gali-
lean strategy, but in a less straightforward manner. Kitcher uses
what he calls an extrapolation of NEA to get to his Realism. Or
as I would put it: he starts by making explicit what he thinks is
already accepted by the acceptance of NEA. He shows that we
have already accepted mind-independent objects and that we can
have accurate representations of them. Here Kitcher uses the ex-
ample of a person travelling on the London Underground, using a
map to navigate. In this example, the term in question, ‘represen-
tation’, becomes very prominent (Kitcher 2001: 181f.). Kitcher,
as NEA demands, describes the traveller as forming representa-
tions of the stations. The success of her attempts at navigating
the London Underground is explained by the accuracy of the-
se representations. The representations of the stations are – for
the sake of easiness, as Kitcher writes – characterised as mental
counterparts of the dots on the map respectively the content of
her representational state as homomorphic to the map. Having
shown that we already accept mind-independent objects and the
fact that we form accurate representations of them in accepting
NEA, Kitcher uses the Galilean strategy again: When Construc-
tivism is defeated once in the realm of everyday life with the
assistance of NEA, there is, according to the Galilean strategy,
no reason to be a constructivist in the realm of science.
3 Three reasons not to use ‘representation’
Before I present my own representation-free version of this argu-
ment, let me make some general points about how Kitcher uses
Representations and the Galilean Strategy 77
the word ‘representation’ and why I think it should not be used
in this way.
In one way it is perfectly harmless to use this word because it can
have a broad and non-specific meaning. Presupposing a broad
sense of ‘representation’, anything might be called a representa-
tion, insofar as it represents something as being a certain way,
i.e. it just has to fulfil a certain function in order to be called a
representation.
In philosophy there are, however, other, more restricted under-
standings of ‘representation’. There are, in addition, multitudi-
nous philosophical debates about how to understand ‘represen-
tation’ correctly and even whether certain ways to understand it
are intelligible. I do not want, nor indeed am I able, to answer
these questions in this article. I will briefly indicate three prima
facie reasons, though, why I think one should not use Kitcher’s
concept of representation.
What then is Kitcher’s concept of representation? He clearly has
something more concrete in mind than what is captured by the
broad position mentioned above. Unfortunately, he does not give
a definition of his own understanding in Real Realism. Neverthe-
less, there are at least three things we can say about Kitcher’s
representations: They (a) are something we form in our dealing
with the world (NEA), (b) can be more or less accurate (Kitcher
2001: 154) and (c) can be characterised as mental counterparts
of a map or of dots on a map (Kitcher 2001: 181f.). In discussion
Kitcher explained that by representation he means the content-
bearing states we are set in when we deal with the world. To
understand aspect (c) better, it is, I suggest, helpful to know
that he added he is convinced that not all such states that guide
us are beliefs (or other propositional attitudes), but that there are
additionally picture-like representations. The mental counterpart
of the underground map of London would be an example of one
of these.2
Given these points, I now present my reasons for not talking of
2 In discussion at the Naturalist Strategies in Ethics and Epistemology
workshop in Zurich on June 30th 2010.
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representations in this sense. Since Kitcher uses the word ‘repre-
sentation’ in NEA, these three points undermine his assumption
that NEA is unquestionable.
3.1 Claims about the structure and functioning of our
mind
My first point challenges talk of mental representations in gene-
ral. Kitcher starts his text with some reflections on the way we
deal with the world. Out of these he produces NEA, which he
takes to be obviously true. Indeed, nobody would deny that we
imagine or perceive the world as being a certain way, i.e. that
we have beliefs that represent the world as being some way or
another. In this sense, it is straightforwardly the case that in
thinking about the world we represent the world (as being in so-
me way or another). By talking about forming representations in
the way Kitcher does, however, more is being claimed. The exi-
stence of certain entities that bear the function of representing
the world is claimed, and a homogeneous category of entities, tho-
se which represent, is supposed. Furthermore, talking of mental
representations also implies a certain idea as to what the connec-
tion between the representing entity and the represented object
has to look like. Overall, such talk supposes a certain structure
of thought. Thought now seems to consist of representing enti-
ties. All these things are far from obvious. That we represent
the world as being in some way insofar as we have beliefs about
the world does not impose any conditions on how thinking is to
be described or what the nature of thought is. By talking about
representations, however, one does restrict the possible ways in
which thought can be described in a way that goes far beyond
our present knowledge of the nature of thought.3
3.2 What makes a representation a representation?
A second line of thought is one that challenges conceptions of
representation which assume that what makes a thing a repre-
3 I thank Joachim Schulte for elucidating this point in discussion.
Representations and the Galilean Strategy 79
sentation is a property of that thing. Kitcher’s concept of repre-
sentation seems to be of this kind. In the case of the map, the
structure of the content of the representation is what makes the
representation a representation of the Underground. Were this
not the case, the fact that the content of the representation is
homomorphic to the map would not per se grant that the mental
counterpart is a representation as is the map.
My critique stems from my understanding of the notion of re-
presentation in the very broad sense that I mentioned before. A
representation is something that represents something, i.e. some-
thing that fulfils a certain function. The function in question is,
in a rough way, relatively easy to understand and I think less pro-
blematic than the notion of representation itself. Paradigm cases
are somebody using something (the representation) to represent
something or someone and something representing something as
being in a certain way. These ways of describing the situation
show that the question of whether something is a representation
in this sense depends heavily on the context in which it stands and
how it is used and seen. On the other hand, the properties a thing
has do not seem to be important for calling it a representation.
Anything can fulfil this function, if it is used to represent, and
nothing is a representation per se. In short: to fulfil the function
of representing something has to be used to represent something,
this is both necessary and sufficient.
This has the consequence that two homomorphic things need not
both be representations. It is possible that one is a representation,
but not the other: My shadow does not represent me. Similarly,
if I walk into an experiment of yours and my silhouette disturbs
the graph of your results, your graph is not a representation of
me, even if the graph is exactly the same shape as my silhouette.
In contrast, if you draw a picture by filling the space where my
shadow is with paint or if you take a photograph of me intentio-
nally, then the result represents me. This is the case because there
exists a practice of using painted silhouettes and photographs as
representations and being used as such is necessary for them to
be representations. That not more than the use as a representa-
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tion is needed is shown by the fact that you may use, say, a salt
cellar to represent me, a building or anything else in your attempt
to describe a situation that is fairly complicated. That the cellar
shares no property with me is just not relevant.
This understanding of ‘representation’ does not exclude the pos-
sibility that there can be something like a mental counterpart of
the map of the London Underground that is a representation. If
I remember the map I used yesterday distinctly enough, I can
use my memory of the map in a manner similar to how I would
have used the map had I not lost it. Nevertheless, also in this
case it would be my use of it that would make my memory a
representation, not its homomorphy to the map. Kitcher seems
to say something close to this when he says that the “referential
connection [between the subject’s mental and linguistic tokens
and objects in her surroundings] is exhibited in the coordinated
role the tokens and the objects play in her behavior” (Kitcher
2001: 182). There are several points, though, that make me doubt
that Kitcher really sees the situation the way I do. Firstly, I do
not see how homomorphy is supposed to make things easier, if it
is use and behaviour which does the work anyway. Secondly, the
behaviour is brought in at this point to explain the referential
connections between a dot on the map and a station. On the one
hand, I would argue one could not start with this connection in
isolation, if one thinks that reference is based on use. Instead, one
has to start with the things we actually use and utter, and these
are whole maps and sentences. On the other hand, the connection
of the map as a whole with the Underground seems already to
be given at this point, and I do not see what else in Kitcher’s
description could establish it, if not the homomorphy. There is a
final point that makes me doubt it is actually the behaviour that
establishes the referential connection, for Kitcher. He describes
persons who “act differently, so that for them, dot and station
play a different role” as persons that are “misreading the map”
(Kitcher 2001: 181f.). Here it gets obvious that there has to be a
further fact, the homomorphy, establishing the connection before
people use the map. Otherwise Kitcher had at this point no basis
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on which he could decide so easily which of them are misreading
the map.
3.3 What makes a map an accurate map?
My final point against representations in Kitcher’s sense follows
on from this last remark. The question is how a representation
can be said to be accurate. The problem I see arises from points
(c) and (b) in Kitcher’s characterisation of representations: that
representations can be things like mental counterparts of maps
and that representations are things that can be accurate. To stay
with the example of the Underground map, I start by questioning
in what sense this mental map (the memory of the map we talked
about in the previous paragraph) can be said to be accurate.
Kitcher would answer that it is accurate if we are successful when
relying on the mental map, whereas we would not be as successful
if we would be acting using another, less accurate map (R7 in
Kitcher 2001: 182).
Let us consider this answer for the moment. The issue then is how
this map results in our acting one way, a successful way, instead of
acting another way. Here my answer differs from the one Kitcher
would give. I think it is very obvious that when we consult the
map, we form certain beliefs, such as where we have to change
lines, if we want to go to, say, Elephant & Castle. We form these
beliefs according to the manner such maps are usually used. In so
doing we rely on various other beliefs, e.g., beliefs about what kind
of map we are confronted with. The map itself does not say where
one has to change lines or whether one has to change lines at all,
if one wants to go to Elephant & Castle. This, I think, is shown by
appreciating that we would act differently when using the same
map, if we did not know what kind of map we were confronted
with or how such maps were normally used. If I did not know
that I were confronted with the Underground map I may, very
unsuccessfully, try to drive by car to my destination by using the
map as road map. Were I to think such a map indicates, by its
colours, the dangerousness of the different Underground lines or
the price one has to pay for the line in question, I would probably
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not be very successful in using the map: my travel might take
much longer than necessary, it might be much more expensive
than necessary or I might be stopped by ticket inspectors before
I reach my destination. The easy explanation as to why persons
making these errors are not successful, even though they use the
same map as the successful persons, is that they form false beliefs
when consulting the map. This shows very clearly that maps do
not influence our actions directly but, rather, prompt us to form
beliefs about the world.
In this sense I would say the map itself is not accurate, at least
not absolutely speaking. It can only be said that a map (and this
is true for every form of non-linguistic information device) is more
or less accurate insofar as ordinary trained persons of our society
normally come to have true beliefs by consulting it. The crucial
point for me is that it is our true beliefs that make our acting
successful. Arriving at these beliefs has something to do with the
map but also with additional beliefs we have and with practices
we master.
4 A different version of the Galilean strategy
I now detail a version of Kitcher’s Galilean strategy which
I am willing to support. This version will be one in which
‘representation’ is replaced by ‘belief’. Let me just indicate a few
points that make me think that the claims Kitcher makes by
using his notion of representation are best rephrased by talking
about beliefs.
One advantage is that it makes NEA a better starting point,
since it makes it less disputable. A further advantage is that
it can be used to describe different situations. Representations
are involved in Kitcher’s description of perception, of a person
navigating the Underground, a scientist manipulating molecules,
etc., and ‘belief’ can be used in all these situations as well.
Another advantage of the notion of belief is that in the refutation
of Empiricism the success-truth inference is very prominent.
By using the word ‘belief’ we are talking, right from the start,
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about something which is truth-apt. Kitcher, in contrast, often
has to switch between talking about true claims or theories, and
accurate representations. Due to restricted space I cannot dwell
on this difficulty, but at the end of the article we will see that it
is symptomatic of the role the notion of representation plays in
this text.
Let me now rephrase Kitcher’s argument. I will call my version
of NEA NEA*.
NEA*: We are animals that form beliefs about the things
around us; the world makes us believe things. Those beliefs, in
turn, guide our behaviour. In observing other people, we take it
for granted that they sometimes have true beliefs about objects,
facts, and events about which we also can build beliefs.
My critique in Section 3 has made clear that this is a bet-
ter starting point for an argument than NEA itself, since I think,
in contrast to NEA, NEA* is indisputable.
The next step, the argument against Empiricism, is clearly
unaffected by my change. The success-truth link central there is
even easier to formulate when using the word ‘belief’. The work
of the Galilean strategy itself does not rest on, or require, the
notion of representation. In my version, the expansion by the
Galilean strategy reveals that there is no reason to prevent the
inference from the success of a theory to the truth of a theory
in science since we already allow this inference in some areas of
science, and we allow it in everyday life.
More difficulties seem to lurk in the strategy against Con-
structivism. As seen above, Kitcher here uses the example of a
person travelling on the London Underground using a map to
navigate. The success of the traveller’s attempts to navigate the
Underground is explained by the accuracy of her representations,
which are characterised as mental counterparts of the dots on
the map. As I see it, though, the step Kitcher wants to make
with this example can also be made talking about beliefs instead
of representations in the mind. The step in question goes from
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describing a person as forming accurate representations to her
forming accurate representations of mind-independent objects.
Kitcher wants to show that with NEA we already have accepted
mind-independent objects and accurate representations of them.
Here is the crucial passage of his text. It starts with a description
of the situation:
“Central to our ordinary explanation of what the subject
does is the idea that she represents objects that would
exist, even if she were not present. We take the dots on
the map as corresponding to things we can pick out in her
environment (underground stations), and we think that
the associated items in her mental state also correspond
to those things. Our basis for making this attribution is
the distinctive role that dot and station play in coordi-
nating her behavior. ‘This is Charing Cross,’ she says, ‘I
must change here’ – and so she does. [...] Finally, we don’t
think of ourselves as necessary to her performance or as
altering its causal structure. The correspondence we reco-
gnize between her mental states and the world is disclosed
through her behavior, not created by our observation and
explanation of it.” (Kitcher 2001: 181f., my italics)
This, Kitcher thinks, commits us to certain theses, R1 to R7.
Realism he says is obtained by relying on the notion of indepen-
dence which is grounded in two of the following theses: R3 and
R4.
“(R1) There is a referential connection between the sub-
ject’s mental and linguistic tokens and objects in her
surroundings.
(R2) That referential connection is exhibited in the coor-
dinated role the tokens and the objects play in her
behavior.
(R3) The referential connection would exist, and her beha-
vior would be caused in the same way, even if we were
not around to observe her.
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(R4) The objects to which she refers would exist, even if
she were not around to interact with them.” (Kitcher
2001: 182, my italics)
I argue that we are committed to exactly the same theses, R3
and R4, notwithstanding my slightly changed description of
the situation: Central to our ordinary explanation of what the
subject does is the idea that she has beliefs about objects that
would exist even if she were not present. We take the dots on the
map as corresponding to things we can pick out in her environ-
ment (Underground stations), and we think that the beliefs she
produces in looking at the map are beliefs about these things. Our
basis for making this attribution is the distinctive role that belief
and station play in coordinating her behavior. Finally, we don’t
think of ourselves as necessary to her performance or as altering
its causal structure. So I think NEA* allows us to demonstrate
that we are committed to mind independent-objects, just as
effectively as NEA does. Since Kitcher claims that Realism is the
result of R3 and R4, we too are committed to Realism. Kitcher
then uses the Galilean strategy to argue that one is allowed
to treat all objects of science as independent objects. In this
step, the substitution of ‘representation’ by ‘belief’ is surely not
problematic. The result, according to my proposal, is that we
are allowed to think that scientific sentences are expressions of
true beliefs about mind-independent objects.
My reformulation of Kitcher’s argument, then, goes as follows:
P1: NEA* is the epistemological attitude of our everyday life.
Everybody accepts it.
P2: NEA* includes a belief in mind-independent objects and in
our having true beliefs about them.
P3: The Galilean strategy allows us to use the ways of justification
we use in our everyday life, in science too.
C: We are justified in believing that we can have true beliefs
about mind-independent scientific objects.
In this argument I gladly agree with the Galilean strategy. Stra-
tegies of justification which are accepted in certain areas may be
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allowed in other areas too, if there are no relevant differences bet-
ween the two areas. I agree with Kitcher that he has successfully
shown that a distinction between observables and unobservables,
however it is drawn, seems not to generate a relevant difference. I
also agree with him that we believe in mind-independent objects
normally and there is no reason not to believe in them in the
areas of science. I suspect, though, that Kitcher’s Real Realism
is supposed to be a stronger position than the Realism resulting
from NEA* together with the Galilean strategy. The differences
between my position and Real Realism are examined in the fol-
lowing paragraph.
5 What Kitcher’s notion of representation
brings into play
My reconstruction shows that the Galilean strategy works well
without using the term ‘representation’. Kitcher’s conclusion, ho-
wever, seems to be stronger than mine. A comparison can now be
made between my conclusion and Kitcher’s in order to identify
which aspects of his conclusion are effects of his use of the word
‘representation’.
Kitcher formulates the position of Real Realism as follows:
“We thus envisage a world of entities independent not just
of each but of all of us, a world that we represent more or
less accurately, and we suppose that what we identify as
our success signal the approximate correctness of some of
our representations.” (Kitcher 2001: 155, my italics)
Comparison with my reformulation makes clear that a certain
truth theory is involved in Kitcher’s version. My own conclusion
is realistic insofar as we do accept mind-independent objects.
Additionally, we accept the fact that we can have true beliefs
about them. My version stays neutral, however, on the question
of which kind of truth theory one holds. In Kitcher’s version
one obviously has to hold a correspondence theory of truth, but
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in his text there is no argument for a correspondence theory
of truth.4 Instead, this theory is brought in implicitly by his
notion of representation. In talking about representations and
the accuracy of representations, Kitcher simply assumes a theory
in which truth lies in a correspondence between mental repre-
sentations and mind-independent objects. The correspondence
in question amounts to more than the fact that the belief that
snow is white is true if and only if snow is white: it is comprised
of something called the accuracy of mental representations. This
accuracy in turn obviously must consist in more than simply the
fact that people normally form true beliefs by using accurate
representations otherwise as an explanation of truth it would
be viciously circular. However, just what this accuracy might
consist in is not explained.
The fact that Kitcher switches freely between talking about
accurate representations and talking about true beliefs or true
theories in his rejection of Empiricism is symptomatic of the
extent to which his particular use of the word ‘representation’
brings with it an entire theory. This truth theory permits the
switching in question: According to it having accurate represen-
tations and having true beliefs is virtually the same thing.
6 Conclusion
To sum up let me restate the two main insights of these reflecti-
ons on Kitcher’s Real Realism:
Firstly, Real Realism does not follow from the Galilean strategy
4 There is a passage at the end of the article where Kitcher seems to
argue for a correspondence theory of truth (Kitcher 2001: 193f.), but
in the first instance he defends correspondence theories in general
whereas he needs a more restricted version of the theory, which is not
defended, and secondly, he just repeats his claim that only accurate
representations can explain success. To understand why Kitcher does
think this one has to consult another text, On the Explanatory Role
of Correspondence Truth (Kitcher 2002).
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alone. The strategy has to be supplemented by a correspondence
theory of truth claiming that truth lies in a correspondence bet-
ween mental representations and mind-independent objects. Mo-
reover these mental representations are, if they correspond to
their object, called correct or accurate. According to this theory,
I have true beliefs when my representations of the things around
me are correct.
Since there are people (certainly some philosophers, myself inclu-
ded) who do not entertain such a truth theory, NEA, as Kitcher
formulates it, can not be thought of as self-evidently true and
therefore would need to be argued for. This holds for NEA be-
cause its formulation uses the term ‘representation’ which, in the
sense in which Kitcher understands it, brings with it the above-
mentioned theory. This in turn is shown by the fact that my
reformulation of Kitcher’s argument avoiding the concept of re-
presentation results in a position that is neutral in regard to the
question of truth theories. Nevertheless, insofar as it claims the
existence of mind-independent objects, this position can be called
Realism.
Secondly, the Galilean strategy itself is a very interesting and
convincing way of extending what we accept in ‘normal’ areas
into highly specific areas, and so offers a way to reject empiri-
cist and constructivist objections to scientific Realism. It works
perfectly well in doing this. Since it is a strategy to extend what
one already allows in certain areas into other areas, the result of
the strategy obviously depends on the starting point. Hence if we
begin from a fairly neutral but indisputable starting point, we
will get a relatively neutral and thus weak result. After all, this
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result will, for the same reasons, be one that is and should be
accepted by most people.
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